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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is brought pursuant to the provisions
of Article VIII, Sections 3 and 5 of the Utah Constitution
and pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals.

Plaintiff appeals from the Third

Judicial District Court's entry of Judgments in favor of
Respondents.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES.
Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953
Rule 11 of U.R.C.P.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court err when it entered sanction
judgments against appellant Jeschke for $10,000.00 and his
intervenor counsel appellant for 82,000.00 based on Sec.
78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 and Rule 11, U.R.C.P., respectively?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of Case

On October 14, 1985 Flint Jeschke was injured in a
rear-end collision in which David T. Willis was the driver
of the other vehicle, a school bus.

Jeschke brought suit

for personal injuries and other claims.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

The case was tried to a jury on November 9, 10,
and 14, 1988. The jury returned a special verdict of
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negligence but no causation and the trial court entered a
judgment thereon of "no cause of action."

The trial judge

suggested that counsel for defendants file a motion for
sanctions under Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. (R 510, P. 301). Such
a motion was filed against Jeschke (R. 370). That same
motion included santions against counsel for Jeschke based
on Rule 11 (R. 370).
C.

Statement of Facts

On October 14, 1985 Flint Jeschke was injured in a
rear-end collision in which David T. Willis was the driver
of the other vehicle, a school bus.

Jeschke brought suit

for personal injuries and other claims.

Said suit was

filed on the 9th day of June, 1987.
By letter dated August 3, 1988, Mr. Ogilvie,
counsel for David T. Willis and Granite School District
advised Jeschke1s counsel that said plaintiff's claims were
"probably fraudulent" (R. 381).
Hansen then called Mr. Ogilvie and made an
appointment to meet with him on August 9, 1988 (R. 392,
Para. 2 ) . Hansen wrote Jeschke a letter dated August 10,
1988 to advise him he'd probably have to withdraw for moral
reasons "unless you can miraculously give me a reasonable
explanation" (Id., Para. 3 ) .
Jeschke responded by phone to that letter and
admitted that the prior vehicle damage had occurred but
there was additional damage in the second accident and that
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could be proved easily because the property damage in the
first accident amounted to under $300.00 and the second was
over $900.00 and both bids for repair costs came from same
repair shop (R. 393, Para. 4 ) . He also explained he
thought the deposition question concerning the prior
accident was whether tve had been in a prior accident with
the same truck and that in the first accident the truck was
parked when it was hit and he was not in it (Id., R. 408).
In said phone call Jeschke said he had not been injured in
a dirt bike accident, that he had only two treatments for
his lower back which bothered him after he was riding a
dirt bike with his wife and friends and that those
individuals could verify that there had been no accident
(Id., Para. 5 ) . Jeschke also said that Dr. Peterson and
not Dr. Burns had treated him for the injuries caused by
riding the dirt bike (Id.).
Concerning the 1983 accident, Jeschke told Hansen
that he did not believe that he had as many treatments as
indicated in Hansenfs letter but there was no question that
it was a serious and major accident (Id., Para. fS) .
Between the letter and phone call last referred
to, Hansen discussed the question of his ethical right and
duty to withdraw from the case with an attorney who had
considerable experience with a firm specializing in
litigation and was advised that he must withdraw if the
client stated his intention to deny the facts the attorney
-3-

knew to be true but if the client acknowledged the truth
and asked only for damages resulting from the aggravation
that there was no ethical problem in his opinion (Id.,
Para. 7) .
On September 24, 1988 Jeschke made certain
corrections to his deposition and swore to them before
Hansen (R. 408).
On September 26, 1988, Hansen sent Jeschke a draft
of his proposed opening statement (R. 409-412) which said
inter alia
"The truck had been in a prior
accident involving its rear end. That
accident occurred about 3 months prior
to the one this case is all about. At
that time Flint, the plaintiff, was not
in the truck. It was a hit and run
case; his own insurance company paid
about S300.00 for the damages. He had
the bumper repaired but not the damages
to the rear end itself. This will be a
focal point of the case as it involves
the severity of the impact.11
Hansen's opening statement contained disclosures
generally consistent with his planned opening (R. 508, P.
10, 11) .
Hansen's opening statement also disclosed the
prior truck accident Jeschke had in 1983 and the dirt bike
incident (Id.) .
Hansen's closing statement acknowledged the prior
truck damage (R. 510, P. 271).
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Hansen spent approximately five hours on September
26 and September 27, 1988 at the Attorney General's office
reading Dr. Burns deposition of over seven hours (R. 392,
para..

).
On September 28, 1988, Hansen filed a Notice of

Withdrawal (Judge Young being out of town or unavailable to
hear a motion on the subject) (R. 394, Para. 14).
On September 29, 1988, Hansen was advised by Judge
Young's clerk that Jeschke must be prepared to go to trial
with or without an attorney on October 4, 1988, and that
the judge was unlikely to permit a withdrawal so close to
the trial date.

Hansen so advised Jeschke of the

conversation with the said clerk (Id., Para. 16).
In the afternoon of October 3, 1988, Hansen went
to Mr. Ogilvie's office with Jeschke!s proposed jury
instructions and learned for the first time that the
defense was not prepared to go forward (Id., Para. 17).
In a lengthy on the record discussion with the
Court on October 4, 1988, Hansen explained that his reasons
for withdrawal were primarily economic (to some extent due
to the fact that Brad Nalder, the key witness regarding the
dirt bike matter had not responded to his September 24,
1988 speed note) and the Court said he could only allow
withdrawal for moral reasons at that point (Id., Para. 18).
Jeschke and Hansen believed then and believe now
that Jeschke did sustain some injuries in this accident
(Id. , Para. 19, R. 403, 404).
-5-

Thomas Soderberg, M.D. and Brian Burns, D.C.
testified in depositions before trial and also at trial
that while there is a general correlation between severity
of impact and injuries sustained that there are many
exceptions to that correlation and that in their opinion
the injuries in question were caused by this accident,
although they had no specific information regarding its
severity (Id., Para. 20).
Reed Fogg, M.D., defendants1 expert, testified at
trial that in his opinion plaintiff suffered minimal
injuries as a result of the subject accident (R. 509, P.
239-242).

He equated the pain to a sprained ankle and

testified the injury should not bother plaintiff beyond two
(2) to four (4) weeks (R. 509, P. 243).
At trial Hansen presented a chart which showed
Jeschke incurred 52,032.00 in chiropractic services (R.
396, Para, 22, R. 413).
Jeschke through his counsel asked the jury, in
good faith, for a verdict of $4,736.00 based on the above
plus $680.00 for loss of income for two weeks off work (the
latter was uncontradicted) (R. 396, Para. 23, R. 413).
On October 22, 1988, Hansen sent: a letter to
Ogilvie which requested proposed certain information and
that certain stipulations be made (R. 414). Ogilvie
rejected the request in the letter by phone (R. 396, Para.
25) .
-6-

At trial, Patrick Luers, M.D. presented visual
proof via X-rays that Jeschke had not suffered the serious
type of soft tissue injuries Jeschke1s medical experts
testified to (R. 509, p. 182-201).

Paul France, a

biophysical expert, ruled out this accident as the cause of
any serious soft tissue injury in his opinion (R. 509, p.
207-216).
None of the evidence referred to in the last
paragraph was ever disclosed to Hansen or Jeschke before
trial (R. 391, Para. 27).
Hansen informed defense counsel he would endeavor
to settle the case for a "nuisance value11 figure when he
rejected Ogilvie's settlement offer of S300.00 (R. 397,
Par. 28 and R. 382). No response was made to Hansen's
inviting a larger settlement offer.
Jeschke and Hansen acted in good faith throughout
the trial of this case (R. 397, Para. 29, R. 403, Para. 2 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred in finding that Jeschkefs
action was without merit and he did not file his suit in
good faith.
The trial court erred in finding that Hansen
violated Rule 11 by signing some pleading, motion or other
paper without reading it or failing to make a reasonable
inquiry that said document was well grounded in fact and
law as required by said rule despite the fact that the all
-7-

of the evidence is that such an inquiry was made and that
all such documents were well grounded in fact and law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
(a) JESCHKE1S SUIT WAS WITHOUT MERIT,
AND (b) JESCHKE DID NOT FILE HIS SUIT IN
GOOD FAITH.
The jury found that Willis was negligent in the
operation of the school bus which collided with Jeschkefs
truck (R. 321). It also found, however, that such
negligence was not the cause of the injuries Jeschke
complained of (R. 321). Thomas Soderberg, M.D. and Rrian
Burns, M.C. testified that in their opinion the injuries in
question were caused by the subject accident (R. 508, P. 82
and R. 505, P. 14, respectively).

Jeschke is not

knowledgeable in medical matters or biophysics and had no
reason to doubt that the opinions of his medical experts
were not correct (R. 403, 404). When adverse proof
confronted him he rebutted it with reasons why a jury
should believe his testimony rather than those of adverse
witnesses (R. 393, Para. 4-6).
It is impossible to prove the negative.

Only a

presumption from lack of the affirmative is available to
him in this appeal since he was denied a notice and
opportunity to be heard as required by the due process
-8-

clauses of our state and federal constitutions.

Thus

Jeschke respectfully submits that there is insufficient
evidence in the record to justify the conclusion as to him
reached by the trial judge*

The judge's subjective opinion

as to the issue is not legally sufficient to support the
$10,000.00 judgment herein appealed from.
To sustain the judgment appealed from will put in
motion a dangerous precedent which defense counsel are
certain to capitalize on to "chill" the filing of many law
suits which are undoubtedly meritorious but which involve
claimants who are not willing to subject themselves to
ruinous judgments for sanctions if they should lose their
case and the judge forms a subjective opinion against them
for whatever reason.
In the trial court respondeents relied primarily
upon Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah, 1983) (R. 383).
Appellants have no quarrel with that case nor with an
excellent law review article published in the Utah Law
Review in 1984 beginning at page 5<?3
Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions."

entitled "Attorney's
It is to be noted

that in Cody the Utah Supreme Court vacated the award of
attorney's fees because there was no proof that the suit
was not brought in good faith.

Appellants here likewise

assert that there is no such proof in this record either.
Even though the jury found in favor of appellant
Jeschke on the issue of negligence, the respondents were
-9-

the prevailing party as the jury found no causation, hence
the first of three "distinct findings" required by Cody for
an award pursuant to Sec. 78-27-56 U.C.A. 1953 was met.
The second distinct finding per Cody is that the
trial court would have to find that the action was "without
merit."

The Cody court stated that term was synonymous

with "frivolous" which was there defined in accordance with
the dictionary definition as being "of little weight or
importance, having no basis in law or fact."

The court in

Cody found the plaintiffs1 causes of action there to be
"without merit."

No such finding was made in this case (R.

427, R. 428). Even if such a finding had been made, it
would not have been supported by the evidence.

On the

contrary the evidence of liability was so clear to
Jeschke?s counsel that he filed a motion for summary
judgment as to the issue (R. 66). Counsel for the school
bus driver and the school district considered the case
important enough that he served 52 interrogatories upon
plaintiff (R. 154), spent eight hours in deposing plaintiff
(R. 123) and some seven hours in deposing plaintiff's
principal medical expert (R. 394), Para. 14) and incurring
expect witness fees of some 510,000.00 (R. 379, Para. 9).
If it was clear that the case had no merit, appellants
respectfully submit that the trial court should have
granted defendants1 motion for a directed verdict and saved
the time and effort of jury instructions, argument and
-10-

deliberations.

He did not do so but took the motion under

advisement (R. 509, p. 248-252).

To denominate the cause

of such exhaustive trial preparation as being of "little
weight or importance" is to torture the meaning of the
terms just quoted.
The third required finding is that of bad faith.
Again the trial court did not make such a finding.

At best

one could be implied from the predicate stated being "The
motion of the State of Bad Faith Attorneys fees."

In any

event the question of bad faith is a question of fact as
noted in the law review article cited above and thus
"should be granted substantial deference on appeal" (P.
599).
Accordingly appellants will focus primarily on the
second essential finding of "without merit" as "the
'without merit1 determination (is) a question of law,
therefore it should be fully reviewable by the appeals"
court."

That article cautioned against the Utah courts

accepting the broader definition "without merit" including
that which "borders on frivolity" as that "adds greater
subjectivity to the 'without merit1 determination" and it
is "more difficult to apply and to review" (84 U.L.R. at p.
598).
Appellants will not endeavor here to canvas the
objective facts upon which the foregoing conclusion of law
might be grounded since the trial court did not specify any
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such facts or factors and respondents' counsel was adamant
that the entire record be provided to establish the basis
for the sanction judgments over appellants1 objection
thereto (R. 441-444).
The record in instant case is in sharp contrast
with the record in Tokip v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah,
1987).

There the court's decision noted "'The record

supports the findings of the trial court that defendant
attempted to avoid liability by testifying falsely."

Here

there was no comparable finding and the strongest case
against plaintiff's testimony could only be that his
testimony may not have been well founded due to his
ignorance of medical matters and his belief that his
injuries complained of were an aggregation of his prior
condition.

That prior condition was indeed grievous. As

to that defendants' principal medical expert said:
Basically, I have no question or no
quarrel that this young man has
difficulty, that he has spine problems.
He can't help but have spine problems.
I see a minimum of 125 patients a week.
I operate on over 300 spines a year.
And so the depth of my clinical
experience is significant. And if he
were to walk into my office and simply
review the X-rays, almost without a
history, I would be most surprised if he
didn't have episodes of low back pain,
if he didn't have difficulty with pain
between his shoulder blades and into his
shoulders and if he didn't have
difficulty with his neck. All of these
are very well documentable on the x-ray
studies that he has and so I strongly
believe this young man does have pain,
that he is uncomfortable.
-12-

I strongly believe also that the
accident did not create this discomfort
or this disability that he currently has
(R. 509, p. 230, 231).
All other cases since Cody which involved the bad
faith statute do not add to its teachings and are not
considered helpful on this appeal.
ARUGMENT
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
HANSEN DID NOT READ A DOCUMENT OR SIGNED
IT WITHOUT A REASONABLE INQUIRY AS TO
ITS MERITS IN FACT AND LAW.
Since Hansen signed numerous documents and none
are identified in the judgment papers as to him, he is in
the same position as Jeschke is with respect to objective
evidence.
Hansen urges this Court to consider the fact that
the judgment creditors have not contradicted Hansen!s
affidavit (R. 392) and that requires a conclusion contrary
to that of the trial judge as all evidence in the record
with relates to Rule 11 is in his favor.
Under Rule 11 of U.R.C.P. the attorney who signs
the document in question certifies that

lf

to the best of his

knowledge, information and belief after reasonable inquiry
it is well founded in fact and warranted by existing law.11
Only by violating that certificate is there a basis for
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sanctions and the measure of the sanctions is "the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing
of the pleading, motion or other papers, including
attorneys fees.11
In this case the trial court substituted its own
standard for that of Rule 11.

The Court found that counsel

was liable because he "could or should have sensed the
nature and lack of merit in the case."

If counsel had in

fact the belief he certified to and that belief was
mistaken due to his being overly optimistic by nature or by
reason of being less intelligent than the average,
sanctions would not be proper.

On the other hand, the

disjunctive alternatives under the trial judge's standard
could be invoked in virtually every case which results in a
"no cause of action."

Such prospect would have a most

chilling effect on personal injury litigation.
There were three documents signed by the
intervening appellant in this case after August 3, 1988,
the date mentioned in the trial court's memorandum decision
(R. 427), to wit:

(1) Motion to Bifricate Trial on

September 16, 1988 (R. 213); (2) Notice of Withdrawal on
September 28, 1988 (R. 216); and (3) Plaintiff's Requests
for Voir Dire Questions, Jury Instructions and For a
Special Verdict on October 4, 1988 (R. 218). As to those
documents no factual inquiry would be involved by reason of
their nature.

Investigation of the law would be required

-14-

as to (3) and that was done as certified*

No claim has

been made that any of these certifications violated Rule
11 .
Respondents1 counsel did not specify in his Rule
11 motion for sanctions which certification was the basis
for sanctions requested under that rule.

On the contrary

he urged the court to base such sanctions on the fact that
appellant's attorney was put on notice prior to trial that
plaintiff's claims were unsubstantiated and "most likely
fraudulent" and yet he proceeded to trial.

Rule 11 does

not by its terms embrace such an expanded risk of
proceeding at one's peril even after making a reasonable
inquiry concerning such notice as occurred here (R.
392-404).
As of the latest Shepard's report there have been
only three Utah cases which have involved Rule 11 U.R.C.P.
to wit:

Utah Dept. of Transp. v. Rayco Corp., 599 P.2d 481

(Utah, 1979); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1327 (Utah App.
1987) ; Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 162 (Utah App.
1989) and only the later dealt with sanctions.
As for the Taylor case, it was undisputed that the
purported will attached to the original complaint
"contained the signature of only one witness."

Since the

law requires two signatures for a will to be valid a
reasonable inquiry by counsel would have disclosed that
plaintiff had no case or that the wrong copy was attached
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if another copy had two signatures.

The Court in that case

thus concluded that by failing to conduct the inquiry
mandated by Rule 11 either the client or his attorney or
both had violated the subject rule.

Since the trial court

imposed sanctions against the client only the Court
remanded for the determination of whether the attorney
should bear all, part or none of the $5,000.00 imposed for
sanctions.
The Taylor case is clearly distinguishable from
the one at bar as there has been no claim that plaintifffs
counsel in this case did not make a reasonable inquiry that
plaintiff's case was "well grounded in fact and warranted
by existing law.11

It is also undisputed that after

defendants1 counsel put plaintiff's counsel on notice that
plaintiff's claim was "probably fraudulent" that
plaintiff's counsel did make an inquiry.

The issue is

whether that inquiry was a reasonable one.

Intervenor

appellant respectfully submits it was because it directly
confronted plaintiff with the facts upon which the fraud
was based, to with, the prior accident in which the pickup
truck in question was involved and the dirt bike incident
(see R. 392, para. 4, 5 ) .
There is no dispute in the record that the first
truck damage amounted to some $300.00 whereas the latter
came to over $900.00 which logically confirms plaintiff's
claim that the accident in question caused damages not
involved in the first accident.

-16-

As for the dirt bike accident the plaintiff
informed his counsel that he had witnesses to prove that
there had not been an accident (an injury caused by rough
riding was acknowledged) and such a witness was produced at
trial (R. 509, p. 245-247).
Additionally plaintiff's counsel sought the advice
of another experienced attorney practicing in this area of
the law who counselled him that he could properly proceed
if the client admitted all the negative facts in question,
with he did (R. 392, para. 7 ) .
It would set a very dangerous precedent for this
court to sustain sanctions against an attorney for carrying
forth his client's cause after a reasonable investigation
that assured him that his client's cause still had merit
but in an amount much less than when the case was first
filed.

Cases of small magnitude are not per se frivolous

if the amounts sustainable in damages justify the expense
of a trial.

Here the amount was indeed marginal but is was

the "victim" of the alleged abuse here that insisted on
trial not the "abuser" since the former would offer only
$300.00 new money to settle.

Although offers of settlement

cannot be used at trial, on appeal the good faith or lack
of it as gleaned from those offers ought to be of
assistance in balancing the societal value of courts not
being saturated with frivolous cases against the right of
all injured parties to have their day in court even if
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their damage claims are so modest that they are
questionable by cost/benefit ratio standards.
In considering the foregoing balance the
appellants respectfully request this court to consider the
fact that a "no cause of action11 judgment per se penalizes
the losing party and discourages litigation.

Respondents1

counsel claims to have spent over 200 hours on this case
which he values at being worth $18,000.00 (R. 394).
Appellantfs counsel spent about half that amount of time
but at his rate of $100.00 per hour that is a loss of
$10,000.00.

Additionally jury fees were assessed against

plaintiff/appellant in the sum of $379.00 which will be due
plus interest at 12% from December 22, 1988 no matter what
the outcome of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
The judgments appealed from herein should be
reversed and vacated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February,

*WoU^
Robert B. Hansen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 26th day of
February, 1990, four true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed by undersigned,

Edward 0. Ogilvie
Reed M. Stringham
Assistant Attorney Generals
236 State Capitol" Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondents

*L~

Robert B. Hansen
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A D D E N D U M

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action
or defense in b a d frith — Exceptions.
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailizg party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brcught or asserted in
good faith, except under Subsection (2):
(2) The court, in its discretion may award no fees
or limited fees against a party ^nder Subsection (1),
but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has died an affidavit of
impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record tie reason for
not awarding fees under the provision of Subsection (1).
1988

certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's tee.
iAmended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and
other papers; sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in his individual name who is
duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The
attorney s address also shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by
the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Q\vAShMA

a-s-^-^A

FLINT JESCHKE,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR BAD FAITH
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

-vsDAVID T. WILLIS, and GRANITE
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants.

Civil No. C87-3852
Judge David S. Young

Based upon Defendants' Motion for Bad Faith Attorneys'
Fees and Costs and matters in support thereof, the record of
proceedings for the above-captioned case, and the Court's Minute
Entry of January 20, 1989,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows:
(1)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, Plaintiff

Flint Jeschke is hereby ordered to pay $10,000.00 in bad faith
attorneys' fees to Defendants with judgment so entered in said
amount;

(2)

Pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, Plaintiff's attorney, Robert B. Hansen, having
proceeded in bad faith, is hereby ordered to pay Defendants
$2,000.00 with judgment soentered in said amount.
DATED this CH.

day of ^CuhMU^-^

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

VID S'.
Third J

Disltriprt Court Judge
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